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I. INTRODUCTION
It is an uncontestable pre-condition of democratic government
that the people have information about the operation of their
government in order to make informed choices at the polls. For
such information to be withheld or manipulated by those holding
public office amounts to little more than tampering with the elec-
toral process and a denial of the ultimate sovereignty that resides
in the American people.
-Former United States Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr.1
Recent events have led to an increased concern about the account-
ability of government officials; all too often those in power have sought
to conduct public business out of the watchful eye of the citizens they
* The author expresses his appreciation to David M. Lawrence, Professor of
Public Law and Government, Institute of Government, Chapel Hill, North Carolina,
for his invaluable assistance in the preparation of this Comment.
1. Ervin, Controlling "Executive Privilege", 20 Loy. L. REv. 11, 11 (1974).
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serve. While some degree of confidentiality is necessary for govern-
ment to operate effectively, the general rule in the American political
system must be that the affairs of government be subject to public scru-
tiny.
The public's right to inspect public records was recognized by the
American common law at least as early as 1823.2 A number of com-
mentators have suggested that the right of inspection has a constitu-
tional basis,3 but only one court has actually found such a constitutional
right.4 Courts have often avoided the constitutional question, perhaps
because the statutory and common law decisions have postponed its de-
lineation.5 Despite the importance of the right of inspection and the
presence of a statutory basis for that right, 6 the North Carolina appel-
late courts have never considered the limits of the right of inspection
in North Carolina." The absence of legal development in this area in-
dicates a degree of indifference among public officials as well as a gen-
eral lack of awareness of the law.8 The purpose of this Comment is
to interpret the current North Carolina law by examining decisions of
other jurisdictions and to make suggestions for improving and imple-
menting the right of access in North Carolina.
2. People ex rel. Palmer v. Vail, 1 Cow. 589 (Sup. Ct. 1823), enforced, 2 Cow.
623 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1824).
3. The first amendment is the major constitutional provision relied on. Note,
Access to Official Information: A Neglected Constitutional Right, 27 IND. L.J. 209
(1952). See also Parks, The Open Government Principle: Applying the Right to Know
Under the Constitution, 26 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1 (1957); Comment, The Public's
Right of Access to Government Information Under the First Amendment, 51 CMr.-
KENT L. REv. 164 (1974); Comment, The First Amendment and the Public Right to
Information, 35 U. Prrr. L. Rav. 93 (1973).
4. Houston Chronicle Publish. Co. v. City of Houston, 531 S.W.2d 177 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1975), writ of error denied per curiam, 536 S.W.2d 559 (Tex. 1976). In
refusing the application for a writ of error, the Texas Supreme Court specifically de-
clined to decide whether there is a constitutional right to inspect public records. 536
S.W.2d at 561.
5. See Black Panther Party v. Kehoe, 42 Cal. App. 3d 645, 654-55, 117 Cal.
Rptr. 106, 111-12 (1974).
6. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 132-1 to -9 (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1975).
7. The North Carolina Supreme Court in 1887 was faced with a case regarding
inspection of records in the office of the register of deeds. That decision, however,
is of little value today because of its reliance upon the fee system used in compensat-
ing the register of deeds. Newton v. Fisher, 98 N.C. 20, 3 S.E. 822 (1887); see
text accompanying notes 124-125 infra.
8. In an experiment in Illinois, 111 requests for public information were sent
to various officials. The officials made no response at all to 61 of the requests.
Divorski, Gordon & Heinz, Public Access to Government Information: A Field Experi-
ment, 68 Nw. U.L. Rav. 240, 257 (1973).
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II. INTERPRETING THE CURRENT NORTH CAROLINA LAW
The North Carolina public records statute9 has never been inter-
preted by the North Carolina appellate courts. Decisions from other
jurisdictions, however, may serve as aids in understanding and inter-
preting North Carolina's statute.10 Those decisions provide valuable
guidance because courts have often been willing to look beyond the
language of their own public records statutes to rely on principles that
are remarkably uniform in almost all jurisdictions.'1
A. Defining "Public Record'"
The original North Carolina statute that recognized the right of
any person to inspect public records was enacted in 1935;12 the section
defining the term "public record" was rewritten in 1975.1 The intent
of the 1975 amendment apparently was to insure that the term be con-
strued broadly: the definition clearly indicates that no record is ex-
cluded merely because of its physical form;'4 the records of "any
agency of North Carolina government or its subdivisions"' 5 are in-
cluded in the definition; and the term "agency" is also defined
broadly.18 Finally, the definition requires that the record be one that
was "made or received pursuant to law or ordinance in connection with
the transaction of public business."' 7
9. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 132-1 to -9 (1974 & Cun. Supp. 1975).
10. For a list of cases from other states that have considered whether particular
documents held by local governments are open to public inspection, see Johnson &
Lawrence, Interpreting North Carolina's Public Records Law, 10 LoCAL GOV'T L. BUlL.
16-34 (Inst. of Gov't, Chapel Hill, N.C., 1977).
11. See Sorley v. Lister, 33 Misc. 2d 471, 218 N.Y.S.2d 215 (Sup. Ct. 1961),
in which the court did not even rely on the public records statutes because they did
not "shed much light on whether the items under consideration are or are not public
records." Id. at 473, 218 N.Y.S.2d at 218.
12. Act of May 2, 1935, ch. 265, § 1, 1935 N.C. Sess. Laws 288.
13. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-1 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
14. "'Public record' or 'public records' shall mean all documents, papers, letters,
maps, books, photographs, films, sound recordings, magnetic or other tapes, electronic
data-processing records, artifacts, or other documentary material, regardless of physical
form or characteristics ...." Id.
15. Id.
16. Agency of North Carolina government or its subdivisions shall mean and
include every public office, public officer or official (State or local, elected or
appointed), institution, board, commission, bureau, council, department, au-
thority or other unit of government of the State or of any county, unit, special
district or other policial subdivision of government.
Id.
17. Id.
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1. The Statute and Its Background
Although North Carolina's current definition of public records is
statutory, an examination of common law definitions and classifications
of records serves to highlight the scope of the present statute. Prior
to 1935, any right of inspection in North Carolina was based on the
common law. Although the North Carolina appellate courts were
never called upon to provide a common law definition of public records,
the decisions of other state courts are instructive. The various common
law definitions of public records contain numerous minor differences,
but they fall into two major groups. The first and narrower definition
is limited to records that are required by law to be made or received,
including records that are intended to serve as notice to the public.18
Records of land transfers, deeds of trust and mortgages are examples
of records that are intended to serve as notice. This definition also
includes all records that any statute or regulation requires a public of-
ficer to make or receive.
A broader definition was recognized in some early decisions", that
held that public records include not only those records required by law
to be made or received, but also records that are "necessary to be kept
in the discharge of a duty imposed by law. ' 20  One court concluded
that it is enough if the record is used and kept in a public office.21
Courts adopting this broader definition found no valid justification for
arbitrarily limiting the definition to records kept as required by law. 2
The modem trend, in both statutes 23 and court decisions,24 has been
toward the broader definition.
Although certain ambiguities exist in the North Carolina statute,
the language of the statute appears to embrace the broader definition
of public records. The statutory definition includes those records
"made or received pursuant to law or ordinance in connection with the
18. E.g., Linder v. Eckard, 261 Iowa 216, 220, 152 N.W.2d 833, 836 (1967);
Lefebvre v. Somersworth Shoe Co., 93 N.H. 354, 355, 41 A.2d 924, 925 (1945).
19. E.g., Robison v. Fishback, 175 Ind. 132, 93 N.E. 666 (1911); Burton v. Tuite,
78 Mich. 218, 44 N.W. 282 (1889), enforced, 80 Mich. 218, 45 N.W. 88 (1890); Cole-
man v. Commonwealth, 66 Va. 585, 25 Gratt. 865 (1874).
20. Robison v. Fishback, 175 Ind. 132, 137, 93 N.E. 666, 669 (1911).
21. Burton v. Tuite, 78 Mich. 218, 44 N.W. 282 (1889), enforced, 80 Mich. 218,
45 N.W. 88 (1890).
22. See, e.g., MacEwan v. Holm, 226 Or. 27, 359 P.2d 413 (1960); Rock County
v. Weirick, 143 Wis. 500, 128 N.W. 94 (1910).
23. See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE § 6252(d) (West Cum. Supp. 1977).
24. See, e.g., Tingling v, Lang, 39 Misc. 2d 338, 240 N.Y.S.2d 633 (Sup. Ct.
1963); MacEwan v. Holm, 226 Or. 27, 359 P.2d 413 (1960).
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transaction of public business."25  The presence of the word "pursu-
ant" appears to indicate that the North Carolina definition includes not
only those records required by law, but also those records kept in carry-
ing out lawful duties. Changes made in the statutory language by the
1975 amendment support this conclusion. The original statute refer-
red only to records "made and received in pursuance of law.126  The
phrase "in connection with the transaction of public business," 27 added
in 1975, corresponds with language used by courts that have adopted
the broader definition.28
The North Carolina statute that grants access to public records also
provides for the regulation of the preservation and destruction of those
records.29 Some courts in other jurisdictions, confronted with a single
definition that applies to both inspection and preservation, have ex-
pressed fears that a broad reading of the definition would impose
substantial administrative record-keeping requirements with respect to a
large number of relatively unimportant records.3 0 Other courts, how-
ever, have found that a broad definition for inspection purposes would
not impose unreasonable record-keeping requirements upon public of-
ficials."
The North Carolina statute indicates that although the same de-
finition applies to both inspection and preservation, 2 the definition of
public records should be interpreted broadly. The statute itself does
not regulate the preservation and destruction of public records-it
delegates that authority to the Department of Cultural Resources. 8
Pursuant to that authority, The County Records Manual34 was pub-
lished in 1970, and The Municipal Records Manual35 was published
25. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-1 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
26. Act of May 2, 1935, ch. 265, § 1, 1935 N.C. Sess. Laws 288.
27. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-1 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
28. See notes 19-21 and accompanying text supra.
29. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 132-1 to -9 (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1975).
30. Such definitions apply to matters such as the types of ink and paper that must
be used in making public records. Town Crier, Inc. v. Chief of Police, 361 Mass.
682, 282 N.E.2d 379 (1972); Kottschade v. Lundberg, 280 Minn. 501, 160 N.W.2d
135 (1968).
31. Citizens for Better Educ. v. Board of Educ., 124 N.J. Super. 523, 308 A.2d
35 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1973); accord, Menge v. City of Manchester, 113 N.H. 533,
311 A.2d 116 (1973).
32. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-1 to -9 (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1975).
33. Id. §§ 121-5, 132-3,-8.1 (1974).
34. NoRTHs CAROLINA STATE DEP'T OiF ARCHIVES & HISTORY, THE CouNTY R c-
ORDS MANUAL (1971).
35. NORTH CAROLINA STATE DEP'T OF ARCHIVES & HISTORY, THE MUNIcrPAL Rnc-
oRws MANUAL (1971). Neither of these manuals apply to records at the state level.
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in 1971. Although the manuals do not require any records to be made,
they identify a large number of public records kept by local officials
and regulate the retention and disposal of those records that have
actually been made or received by local officials. Any record listed
in those manuals should be considered a public record for preservation
purposes because the courts should be expected to give deference to
the expertise of an agency charged with interpreting and applying the
statute. Such records should also be considered public records for in-
spection purposes unless they fit within an exemption. On the other
hand, the omission of a record from the schedules in the manuals
should not preclude a determination that the record is nevertheless a
public record.3
2. Use of the Term "Public Record"
The term "public record" is used in a number of different con-
texts, and the definition can vary depending on its particular applica-
tion. The definition is important in determining the status of a record
for such diverse purposes as evidence, constructive notice, judicial
notice, destruction, preservation and public inspection. Although dif-
ferent underlying issues are raised in the various contexts, many courts
attempt to apply the same definition to various situations without ex-
plicitly identifying those considerations that distinguish one application
from another. Whether they explicitly recognize it or not, however,
courts do indeed vary the definition depending upon the particular use
of the term, and an awareness of these distinctions can sometimes re-
solve apparent conflicts in the cases. 87
Conceptual inconsistencies and confusing decisions can often be
avoided when courts clarify their definitions, recognizing that the scope
of the definition should vary depending upon the purposes for which
the record is to be used. For example, a narrow definition might be
preferred in an evidentiary context because the ultimate concern is to
ensure the authenticity of the record. On the other hand, the definition
should be broad in the context of public inspection because the pur-
poses of allowing inspection are broad-access to public records can
enhance governmental accountability, encourage informed participa-
36. THE CoUNTY REcoRDs MANUrA, supra note 34, at 2, art. 6; THE MUNICIPAL
RECORDS MANUAL, supra note 35, at 2, art. 6.
37. See Robison v. Fishback, 175 Ind. 132, 137, 93 N.E. 666, 668 (1911); Mac-
Ewan v. Holm, 226 Or. 27, 38-39, 359 P.2d 413, 418 (1960).
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tion in government and increase public confidence in the political sys-
tem 38
Confusion can also arise in describing records that are exempt
from public inspection. A particular record might be included in the
general definition of public records, but exempt from public inspection
by a particular statute or judicial decision. Courts often state that a
record not open to inspection is not a public record. 9 Such a record
is, however, a public record in that it is public property, and penalties
for destruction or removal of the record are still applicable.4"
B. Records Exempt From Public Inspection
Although the definition of public records is broad, courts have
found that certain records are not required to be made available for
inspection by members of the public. Records may be exempt from
inspection because a statute precludes public inspection,4 1 because the
courts find that confidentiality is required as a matter of public policy42
or because the information contained in the records is privileged.43
Exemptions are normally found, however, only after considering the
need for confidentiality in light of the public policy favoring disclosure
of public records.
1. Exemptions
A number of special statutes control the status of particular
records in North Carolina.44 The application of those special statutes
38. See MacEwan v. Holm, 266 Or. 27, 38-39, 359 P.2d 413, 418 (1960).
39. E.g., State ex rel. Spencer v. Freedy, 198 Wis. 388, 223 N.W. 861 (1929).
40. People v. Pearson, 111 Cal. App. 2d 9, 244 P.2d 35 (1952).
41. E.g., N.C. GuN. STAT. §§ 48-24 to -27 (1976).
42. E.g., Lee v. Beach Publishing Co., 127 Fla. 600, 173 So. 440 (1937).
43. See text accompanying notes 61-64 infra.
44. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-109(a) (Cum. Supp. 197.5) (court records); id.
§ 7A-287 (1969) (juvenile justice records); id. § 9-4 (jury lists); id. § 15-207 (1975)
(probation records); id. § 15A-623 (d), -623(e) (records of grand jury proceedings);
id. § 20-26 (Supp. 1975) (driver's license records); id. § 20-42(b), -43 (records main-
tained by the Division of Motor Vehicles); id. H9 20-166.1(i), (j) (accident reports);
id. § 34-15 (1976) (veterans' records); id. H9 48-24 to -27 (adoption records); id. §
74-24.13 (Supp. 1975) (mine safety records); id. § 75A-5(f) (1975) (boating records
maintained by the Wildlife Resources Commission); id. § 97-92(b) (1972) (workmen's
compensation records); id. § 105-259 (Cum. Supp. 1975) (state tax records); id. §
105-289(e) (records furnished to local tax authorities by the Department of Revenue);
id. § 105-296(h) (business records used for appraisal of property for tax purposes);
id. H9 108-16, -45 (1975) (social services records); id. H9 108-75.2, .9 (Supp. 1975)
(records relating to the licensing of charitable organizations); id. § 111-28 (1975) (rec-
ords relating to the needy blind); Id. H9 114-10(2), -10.1(c) (records of the Division
of Criminal Statistics and the Police Information Network); id. § 114-15 (records of
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is sometimes unclear, and the policies underlying a particular statute
must often be carefully examined to determine exactly which records
are included in the statute4" and which parties are allowed to inspect
those records.46
Despite the broad definitions given to the term "public record,"
courts have consistently found that public policy requires some records
to be kept secret.41 When the right of inspection is solely a product
of judicial creation, it is clearly within the power of the courts to create
exemptions; however, even in the presence of statutes permitting pub-
lic inspection of a broad class of records, courts have continued to rely
on common law principles to create exemptions when none are pro-
vided in the statute.48 Although continued adherence to common law
the State Bureau of Investigation); id.,§ 115-100.8(a) (Supp. 1975) (proposed school
budgets); id. § 116-222 (Interim Supp. 1976) (records of self-insurance programs estab-
lished for health-care practitioners by the University of North Carolina); id. § 120-
47.6 (Cum. Supp. 1975) (lobbyists' expense records); id. § 120-50 (1974) (lobbyists'
registration records); id. §§ 126-22 to -28 (Cum. Supp. 1975) (personnel records of
state employees); id. § 130-64 (1974) (birth and death certificates); id. § 130-200
(Cum. Supp. 1975) (autopsy reports); id. § 143-341(9)(f) (1974) (records of cost-
sharing data processing centers); id. § 148-76 (prison records); id. § 150A-1 1(3) (Cum.
Supp. 1975) (records pertaining to agency orders, decisions and opinions); id. § 153A-
98 (personnel records of county employees); id. § 160A-168 (1976) (personnel records
of city employees); id. §§ 163-66, -171, -228 (election records).
This list of special statutes is not intended to be complete. Whenever the status
of a particular record is in doubt, a search should be made for relevant special statutes
before relying wholly on the provisions of the public records statute.
45. For example, no statute refers specifically to the status of juvenile arrest rec-
ords. The North Carolina courts could be expected to find, however, that juvenile
arrest records must be withheld from public inspection by virtue of the requirement
of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-287 (1969) that all juvenile court records be withheld from
public inspection. Although a police record of a juvenile arrest is not a juvenile court
record, the policies of the Juvenile Court Act would be frustrated if police agencies
were required to make public the names of arrested juveniles. See 44 N.C. ATr'y GEN.
305 (1975). See also Patterson v. Tribune Co., 146 So. 2d 623 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1962), cert. denied, 153 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 1963).
In a more obvious case, another court held that when a statute required proceed-
ings of a grand jury to be secret, the record of those proceedings must also be secret.
Hewitt v. Webster, 118 So. 2d 688 (La. Ct. App. 1960).
46. For example, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-76 (1974) requires prisoners' files to
be made available to certain named parties. The North Carolina courts have held that
the list of parties in the statute is exclusive; therefore, a prisoner has no right to
inspect his own prison records. Goble v. Bounds, 13 N.C. App. 579, 186 S.E.2d 638,
affd, 281 N.C. 307, 188 S.E.2d 347 (1972).
47. E.g., Lee v. Beach Publishing Co., 127 Fla. 600, 173 So. 440 (1937); Stack
v. Borelli, 3 N.J. Super. 546, 66 A.2d 904 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1949).
48. E.g., UAW v. Gooding, 251 Wis. 362, 29 N.W.2d 730 (1947).
The New Jersey Supreme Court held that their public records statute did not dimin-
ish the common law right of inspection in Irval Realty, Inc. v. Board of Pub. Util.
Comm'rs, 61 N.J. 366, 294 A.2d 425 (1972). That ruling, however, has had little,
if any, effect on the results of subsequent litigation because a record specifically exempt
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exemptions is not specifically authorized by the terms of statutes similar
to the North Carolina act, the failure of the legislature to provide mean-
ingful guidance has led the courts either to ignore or to look beyond
the terms of the statute to a public policy analysis. 9 In utilizing this
public policy analysis, the courts are placed in a quasi-legislative role,
attempting to give meaning to a rather nebulous and constantly evolv-
ing standard. Any definition of the public interest leaves much room
for subjective interpretation; therefore, the application of the public in-
terest standard can only be understood by examining major areas in
which courts have created exemptions.
One of the oldest exemptions created by the courts is that certain
police records be withheld from public view in the public interest.5 0
This exemption does not extend to every record maintained by the
police,5' but it clearly includes files and other records relating to crim-
inal investigations., 2 The policy reasons for this exemption .are to en-
courage police to enter information freely in their reports, to avoid tip-
ping off the subjects of investigation and to protect confidential inves-
tigative techniques.5 "
Courts have also created exemptions to protect the government's
sources of information. Sources must sometimes be protected, not only
in the areas of criminal law enforcement and corrections,5" but also in
from inspection by statute will also be exempt under the public interest standard of
the common law. See Trenton Times Corp. v. Board of Educ., 138 N.J. Super. 357,
351 A.2d 30 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976) (per curiam); Nero v. Hyland, 136 NJ.
Super. 537, 347 A.2d 29 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1975).
49. E.g., Craemer v. Superior Court, 265 Cal. App. 2d 216, 221-22, 71 Cal. Rptr.
193, 198-99 (1968).
50. E.g., People v. Wilkins, 135 Cal. App. 2d 371, 377-78, 287 P.2d 555, 559
(1955); Lee v. Beach Publishing Co., 127 Fla. 600, 604, 173 So. 440, 442 (1937);
Sapienza v. Paul, 42 Haw. 14, 22 (1957); Whittle v. Munshower, 221 Md. 258, 261,
155 A.2d 670, 671-72 (1959).
51. For example, records relating to police department internal procedures have
been held to be open to public inspection. Cook v. Craig, 55 Cal. App. 3d 773, 127
Cal. Rptr. 712 (1976). Contra, United States v. Mackey, 36 F.R.D. 431 (D.D.C.
1965). Other police records have also been held to be open to public inspection. People
v. Coleman, 75 Misc. 2d 1090, 349 N.Y.S.2d 298 (Nassau County Ct. 1973) (records
of citizen complaints against officers); Dayton Newspapers, Inc. v. City of Dayton,
45 Ohio St. 2d 107, 341 N.E.2d 576 (1976) (arrest records); Florence Morning News,
Inc. v. Building Comm'n, 265 S.C. 389, 218 S.E.2d 881 (1975) (jail book and log);
Beckon v. Emery, 36 Wis. 2d 510, 153 N.W.2d 501 (1967) (traffic citations).
52. Glow v. State, 319 So. 2d 47 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); City of St. Matthews
v. Voice of St. Matthews, Inc., 519 S.W.2d 811 (Ky. 1974); Blandford v. McClellan,
173 Misc. 15, 16 N.Y.S.2d 919 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
53. People v. Pearson, 111 Cal. App. 2d 9, 244 P.2d 35 (1952); Glow v. State,
319 So. 2d 47 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
54. See Runyon v. Board of Prison Terms & Paroles, 26 Cal. App. 2d 183, 79 P.2d
101 (1938).
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other administrative areas. Private parties may resist providing infor-
mation to the government unless confidentiality is assured. 5 Promises
by public officials to maintain confidentiality, however, should not be
made lightly, because courts will honor such promises only when re-
quired by a statute or by the public interest.5
In cases in which persons have sought inspection of land appraisals
prior to purchase or condemnation of the land by government agencies,
some courts have created exemptions if the land transactions are not
final.57  These cases suggest that courts are sometimes willing to find
exemptions if disclosure would harm the governmerit's financial inter-
ests. Such an exemption is generally intended to avoid giving unfair
competitive advantages to persons doing business with the government.
One court, however, has specifically rejected this exemption, holding
that potential harm to the government's financial interests during nego-
tiations for land acquisition is an irrelevant consideration. 58
As a result of the proliferation of government-held information
concerning private citizens, some courts have begun to recognize legiti-
mate privacy interests, creating exemptions when disclosure would re-
sult in an unjustified invasion of personal privacy." The North Car-
olina courts have not yet faced this issue under the public records stat-
ute, but the North Carolina Court of Appeals recently recognized that
the fundamental right to personal privacy justified a superior court
order prohibiting public disclosure of information submitted to the at-
torney general in connection with a criminal investigation. 0
2. Privilege
Even in the absence of specific statutory exemptions denying pub-
lic access to privileged records, courts have generally recognized that
any privileged records may be withheld from public inspection. Such
exemptions may exist because the privilege statute itself is construed
55. City of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 38 Cal. 2d 156, 238 P.2d 581 (1951).
56. Papadopoulos v. State Bd. of Higher Educ., 8 Or. App. 445, 494 P.2d 260
(1972).
57. Linder v. Eckard, 261 Iowa 216, 152 N.W.2d 833 (1967); Sorley v. Lister,
33 Misc. 2d 471, 218 N.Y.S.2d 215 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
58. Gannett Co. v. Goldtrap, 302 So. 2d 175 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
59. Wisher v. News-Press Publishing Co., 310 So. 2d 345 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1975); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. State, 282 Minn. 86, 163 N.W.2d 46 (1968).
See also People v. Russel, 214 Cal. App. 2d 445, 29 Cal. Rptr. 562 (1963).
60. In re Investigation by Att'y Gen., 30 N.C. App. 585, 588, 227 S.E.2d 645,
647 (1976).
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to apply not only to the giving of testimony, but also to any other
method of disclosing privileged information. 61 The more prevalent ap-
proach is for courts to use the policies underlying the privilege statutes
as support for the conclusion that the public interest requires privileged
records to be exempt from the disclosure requirements of the public
records statute. 62 Whatever the legal justifications for such an ex-
emption, privileges such as attorney-client or doctor-patient63 have gen-
erally justified refusals to permit public inspection.
The only privilege specifically mentioned in the North Carolina
public records statute provides a three-year privilege for certain con-
fidential communications made by legal counsel to a public board or
agency, but it does not cover the reverse situation of communications
made by the agency to legal counsel.64 Despite the statute's failure
to provide for the confidentiality of an agency's communications to
counsel, it seems likely that the North Carolina courts would permit
such communications to remain confidential if they were made within
the scope of the traditional attorney-client privilege. The major policy
justification for the attorney-client privilege is to protect communica-
tions made by the client to the attorney rather than vice versa,65 and
the legislature may have assumed that an explicit statutory provision
was needed only to protect communications made by an attorney to the
governmental client. Without regard to the statutory language, the ex-
istence of a testimonial attorney-client privilege indicates that good
public policy requires that confidentiality of privileged communications
be maintained, even if the client is a government officer or agency.
Despite the availability of a privilege, inspection must be permitted
when the privilege has been waived. 6 Courts generally view privilege
claims with disfavor, looking for inapplicability or waiver of the privil-
ege.6 7 The North Carolina statute that provides the limited attorney-
client privilege specifically allows the governmental body to waive the
61. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Board of Trustees, 178 Mich. 193, 144
N.W. 538 (1913).
62. Jessup v. Superior Court, 151 Cal. App. 2d 102, 311 P.2d 177 (1957); Min-
neapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. State, 282 Minn. 86, 163 N.W.2d 46 (1968).
63. See Pyramid Life Ins. Co. v. Masonic Hosp. Ass'n, 191 F. Supp. 51 (W.D.
Okla. 1961).
64. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-1.1 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
65. C. McCoRmIcK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF EViDBNCE § 89, at 182-83 (2d
ed. E. Cleary 1972).
66. People ex rel. Brownell v. Higgins, 96 Misc. 485, 160 N.Y.S. 721 (Sup. Ct.
1916).
67. See, e.g., Black Panther Party v. Kehoe, 42 Cal. App. 3d 645, 117 Cal. Rptr.
106 (1974).
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privilege. 68 If the privilege exists for the benefit of the agency or
board, disclosure to a member of the public should be sufficient to con-
stitute waiver.6 9
3. The Effects of Exemptions
Sometimes a particular record appears to fit within one of the ex-
emptions, but the courts nevertheless may be willing to find that the
public interest requires disclosure, even when the exemption is pro-
vided by statute. In such a situation, a person's need for inspection
of the record may be an important factor. Although personal need for
records is not of primary importance in evaluating the public interest,
private concerns are often construed to coincide with legitimate public
interests.70
If a public record is not exempt from public inspection, the law
requires that it be made available to any person requesting an inspec-
tion.71 On the other hand, it is possible that public officials might want
to disclose to the public a record that fits within one of the exemptions.
In a few situations, confidentiality has been required, and the custodian
has been held to have no authority to permit public inspection. A priv-
ilege such as doctor-patient may not be waived by a public agency;
72
statutory language sometimes indicates that public inspection of a par-
ticular record must not be permitted; 73 and one court has indicated that
confidentiality is mandatory if disclosure would violate a person's con-
stitutional right of privacy. 4 With these exceptions, the exemptions
68. N.C. GFN. STAT. § 132-1.1 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
69. Coldwell v. Board of Pub. Works, 187 Cal. 510, 202 P. 879 (1921).
70. For example, a farmworker who developed certain adverse reactions to pesti-
cides used in the fields needed to inspect reports submitted by commercial pest control
applicators to the county agricultural commissioner in order to gain effective medical
treatment. Finding that the public interest in the health and welfare of citizens is
compatible with an individual's interest in gaining access to records needed to obtain
effective medical treatment, the court expressed its willingness to allow strong consid-
erations of public policy to override the express exemptions provided by statute. Uribe
v. Howie, 19 Cal. App. 3d 194, 96 Cal. Rptr. 493 (1971). Another court held that
although a particular tax record was not normally open to public inspection, access
must be allowed to assist petitioner in an administrative appeal. Tagliabue v. North
Bergen Township, 9 N.J. 32, 86 A.2d 773 (1952).
71. See text accompanying notes 78-83 infra.
72. The doctor-patient privilege exists for the patient's benefit, and disclosure of
such records should require the patient's permission. Pyramid Life Ins. Co. v. Masonic
Hosp. Ass'n, 191 F. Supp. 51 (W.D. Okla. 1961).
73. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-296(h) (Cum. Supp. 1975) (tax supervisors pro-
hibited from disclosing financial information submitted by business enterprises except
that which is necessary to list or appraise property).
74. People ex rel. Better Broadcasting Council, Inc. v. Keane, 17 Ill. App. 3d
1090, 309 N.E.2d 362 (1973).
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provided by statute or the common law do not require that the records
be withheld, and the agency may, in its discretion, disclose such records
to the public.7 5
The equal protection clause of the United States Constitution gen-
erally prohibits discrimination in granting access to public records.
Once the custodian has permitted a particular record to be inspected
by a member of the public, he may not later claim that the record is
exempt from public inspection. Selective disclosure is permissible,
however, when there is a rational basis for such action. For ex-
ample, it may be permissible for a public agency that maintains records
on individuals to permit only the subject to inspect his records. It is
clear, however, that equal rights of inspection must be granted to all
persons similarly situated.76
Finally, it should be remembered that records exempt .from gen-
eral public inspection may nevertheless be available through discovery
for use in litigation. The standards for discovery of public records differ
from the standards for public inspection, and exemptions from general
public inspection, whether by statute or under the common law, have
no direct impact upon a discovery order.77
C. Who May Inspect Public Records?
At common law, a person or his agent7" had a right to inspect a
particular public record only if he had a legal interest in the docu-
ment.7 9 The interest, however, did not have to be private-it was
enough if inspection would enhance or promote some legitimate public
interest. The application of such an interest requirement often became
confusing, even meaningless, because almost any citizen or taxpayer
75. Black Panther Party v. Kehoe, 42 Cal. App. 3d 645, 117 Cal. Rptr. 106
(1974).
76. Quad-City Community News Serv., Inc. v. Jebens, 334 F. Supp. 8 (S.D. Iowa
1971). See also Black Panther Party v. Kehoe, 42 Cal. App. 3d 645, 117 Cal. Rptr.
106 (1974).
77. Fears v. Burris Mfg. Co., 48 F.R.D. 91 (N.D. Miss. 1969); Nunziata v. Police
Dep't, 73 Misc. 2d 29, 341 N.Y.S.2d 22 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
78. State ex rel. Hansen v. Schall, 126 Conn. 536, 12 A.2d 767 (1940); People
ex rel. Busby v. Smith, 342 Ill. App. 448, 96 N.E.2d 830 (1951); Pressman v. Elgin,
187 Md. 446, 50 A.2d 560 (1947).
79. Brewer v. Watson, 71 Ala. 299 (1882); State ex rel. Ferry v. Williams, 41
NJ.L. 332 (1879); State v. Harrison, 130 W. Va. 246, 43 S.E.2d 214 (1947). See
also Newton v. Fisher, 98 N.C. 20, 3 S.E. 822 (1887).
Courts have disagreed as to the origin of the interest requirement. Some courts
have stated that the interest requirement was a direct limitation upon the right of inspec-
tion. E.g., Brewer v. Watson, 71 Ala. 299 (1882). Others have found that the right
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could assert some legitimate public interest to justify an inspection.80
At least one court has concluded that the interest requirement is an
unwarranted impediment to a common law right of inspection.81 The
North Carolina statute has eliminated the difficulties caused by the
common law interest requirement. In North Carolina, the right of in-
spection granted by the statute may be exercised by "any person,"82
and such language in other states has been taken to indicate clearly
that the interest requirement has been eliminated.s3
D. Access to Public Records
The North Carolina statute provides that "[e]very person having
custody of public records shall permit them to be inspected and ex-
amined at reasonable times and under his supervision by any person
.. "8 The custodian of public records85 must comply with any re-
quest for inspection if the request is sufficiently definite to enable the
records to be located. 8 Courts have identified certain positive ele-
ments that are necessary to provide an effective right of inspection.
Adequate space must be provided for inspection, 7 and the custodian
must permit public records to be inspected during office hours.88
Members of the public must be allowed personally to examine the orig-
inals of public records where they are normally kept.8 9 The right to
of inspection existed for the benefit of any person, but the remedy, mandamus, was
only available to persons with an interest in the record. E.g., Colnon v. Orr, 71 Cal.
43, 11 P. 814 (1886). One court compounded the confusion by adopting both rules
concerning the origin of the interest requirement. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times
Co. v. Curtis, 335 S.W.2d 934 (Ky. 1959).
80. See, e.g., Holcombe v. State ex rel. Chandler, 240 Ala. 590, 200 So. 739
(1941); Excise Comm'n v. State ex rel. Skinner, 179 Ala. 654, 60 So. 812 (1912);
Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co. v. Curtis, 335 S.W.2d 934 (Ky. 1959); State
ex rel. Charleston Mail Ass'n v. Kelly, 149 W. Va. 766, 143 S.E.2d 136 (1965).
81. City of St. Matthews v. Voice of St. Matthews, Inc., 519 S.W.2d 811 (Ky.
1974).
82. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 132-6, -9 (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1975).
83. Direct Mail Serv., Inc. v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 296 Mass. 353, 5 N.E.2d
545 (1937); Orange County Public. Div. of Ottaway Newspapers-Radio, Inc. v. White,
55 Misc. 2d 42, 284 N.Y.S.2d 293 (Sup. Ct. 1967); Hanson v. Eichstaedt, 69 Wis. 538,
35 N.W. 30 (1887).
84. N.C. GEN. SrAT. § 132-6 (1974).
85. The custodian is defined as "[t]he public official in charge of an office hav-
ing public records." Id. § 132-2.
86. See Rosenthal v. Hansen, 34 Cal. App. 3d 754, 110 Cal. Rptr. 257 (1973);
Dunlea v. Goldmark, 85 Misc. 2d 198, 380 N.Y.S.2d 496 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
87. See Bruce v. Gregory, 65 Cal. 2d 666, 423 P.2d 193, 56 Cal. Rptr. 265 (1967).
88. See id. See also Sorley v. Lister, 33 Misc. 2d 471, 218 N.Y.S.2d 215 (Sup.
Ct. 1961).
89. Florence Morning News, Inc. v. Building Comm'n, 265 S.C. 389, 396, 218
S.E.2d 881, 884 (1975).
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inspect public records includes the right to make copies, either on a
typewriter, by hand or by photography.90
Courts often state that the right to inspect public records is an ab-
solute right.9 A number of practical necessities, however, require that
certain limitations be placed upon that right. The safety of the records
must be assured and undue interference with official duties should be
avoided. Requests for inspection must be reasonable and costs must
sometimes be borne by the person inspecting the records. Establishing
reasonable regulations regarding access to public records is a discre-
tionary matter that depends upon the characteristics of the public of-
fices involved; 92 however, that discretion is limited. When regulations
are made on an ad hoc basis, the chances for arbitrary and unreason-
able limitations on the right of access are increased. Therefore, those
regulations should be promulgated in advance, either by the governing
board or by the custodian pursuant to policies established by the gov-
erning board, and the regulations should be made available to persons
seeking access.93 The discretionary power to establish such regulations
must be exercised in a manner consistent with the public's right to in-
spect public records. The right of access is considered an important
right in a popular government, and any limitations upon that right are
permissible only to the extent necessary to protect the records and to
prevent undue interference with official duties.94
1. Protection of Public Records
The general rule requires that members of the public be allowed
personally to inspect originals of public records where they are normally
kept. The right to inspect originals exists even if the facts contained
in the record have been published and made available to the public. 95
Although this rule must be followed as closely as possible, the duty of
the custodian to care for the public records in his office96 and to super-
90. See, e.g., People ex rel. Gibson v. Peller, 34 Ill. App. 2d 372, 181 N.E.2d
376 (1962); Matte v. City of Winooski, 129 Vt. 61, 271 A.2d 830 (1970).
91. See, e.g., Pressman v. Elgin, 187 Md. 446, 50 A.2d 560 (1947).
92. Upton v. Catlin, 17 Colo. 546, 31 P. 172 (1892); Sorley v. Lister, 33 Misc.
2d 471, 218 N.Y.S.2d 215 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
93. See City of Philadelphia v. Ruczynski, 24 Pa. D. & C.2d 478 (C.P. 1961).
94. See generally Whorton v. Gaspard, 239 Ark. 715, 393 S.W.2d 773 (1965);
Marsh v. Sanders, 110 La. 726, 34 So. 752 (1903); Direct Mail Serv., Inc. v. Registrar
of Motor Vehicles, 296 Mass. 353, 5 N.E.2d 545 (1937).
95. Caple v. Brown, 323 So. 2d 217 (La. Ct. App. 1975).
96. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-7 (1974).
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vise public inspection 7 clearly indicates that certain necessary precau-
tions can serve as limitations upon the rule. For example, if there is
a substantial threat to the security of a particular record, the custodian
can make copies of the record available to members of the public in
a safe location. Such a denial of access to the originals will be upheld
only when the security problems are clearly shown to be substantial. 8
Concerns for the safety of public records can also justify limited
curtailment of access to the original records, particularly when the re-
cords are stored in files. A rule providing that a person desiring ac-
cess to certain files must choose the files he wants to inspect from a
list of all the files in the office has been upheld as a proper method
of protecting files that are easily lost or misplaced. 90 In rare situations,
concern for the safety of records can justify a total denial of access.
For example, one state court found that although the ballots cast in
an election appeared to fit the definition of public records, inspection
by members of the public would endanger the safety of the ballots and
perhaps make them inadmissible in an election contest. A complete
denial of access was held to be proper, at least until after the time al-
lowed for challenges had passed.100
The custodian is also required to provide adequate space for in-
spection of public records.' 0' The space that will be adequate depends
on the size of the office and the number of requests for inspection. In
a large office that receives many requests for inspection, it may be
necessary to provide a special area devoted exclusively to inspection
of public records. On the other hand, in an office that receives few,
if any, requests for inspection, it should be enough to provide an un-
occupied chair along with a table or desk when the need arises. In
providing space for inspection, the custodian must remain aware of his
duty to supervise the inspection. Although a particular situation might
justify removal of the records to another office for purposes of inspec-
tion, adequate supervision is normally facilitated by requiring that in-
spection be conducted in the office or area where the records are nor-
mally kept. 102
97. See id. § 132-6.
98. Florence Morning News, Inc. v. Building Comm'n, 265 S.C. 389, 218 S.E.2d
881 (1975).
99. Gorton v. Dow, 54 Misc. 2d 509, 282 N.Y.S.2d 841 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
100. State ex rel Roussel v. St. John the Baptist Parish School Bd., 135 So. 2d
665 (La. Ct. App. 1961); cf. People ex rel. Sherman v. Slater, 42 Ill. App. 3d 396,
355 N.E.2d 735 (1976) (production of voter affidavits allowed).
101. See Bruce v. Gregory, 65 Cal. 2d 666, 423 P.2d 193, 56 Cal. Rptr. 265 (1967).
102. See Sorley v. Lister, 33 Misc. 2d 471, 218 N.Y.S.2d 215 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
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2. Minimizing Disruption of Public Offices
In addition to the concern for protection of public records, a
number of administrative considerations affect the right of access. The
general rule is that access should be allowed during all business
hours. 10 However, in one case involving an office that was open from
8 a.m. until 5 p.m., the reviewing court found no substantial denial of
access when the records were made available only between the hours
of 8:30 a.m. and 4:30 p.m.104 It is also proper to deny access during
hours in which the sole custodian of the records is required to be out
of the office.105
Access may be limited whenever necessary to prevent undue in-
terference with agency functioning. While the agency's use of public
records must normally take priority over the use of those records by
members of the public, the custodian's duty to permit access is no less
important than other official duties.' 0 6 Therefore, it is not permissible
to deny access because of mere inconvenience or because the custodian
has too much other work to do.10 7
Problems with agency functioning may arise when records are
needed by agency employees or when public demand for inspection is
substantial; however, any limits on access that are intended to prevent
interference with the functioning of an agency are permissible only
when those limits are strictly necessary to prevent direct interference
with the work of the office. 08  A period of greater workload is not,
in itself, a sufficient reason to deny or limit access.' 0 9 While it is im-
possible to suggest specific rules that will be appropriate in every case,
one court has clearly stated the conditions that must exist before access
may be limited. The court held that inspection may be denied or re-
stricted only if: (1) the records are needed by officials or employees
in the course of their work; (2) the adequate office space provided
for public inspection is in use by other members of the public at that
time; (3) there is valid reason to fear defacement or other damage to
the records, and supervision is, at that moment, impossible; or (4) the
103. Id.
104. Bruce v. Gregory, 65 Cal. 2d 666, 423 P.2d 193, 56 Cal. Rptr. 265 (1967).
105. Upton v. Catlin, 17 Colo. 546, 31 P. 172 (1892).
106. State ex rel. Research Institute v. Nix, 195 Okla. 176, 155 P.2d 983 (1944).
107. Weinstein v. Rosenbloom, 59 Ill. 2d 475, 322 N.E.2d 20 (1974); State ex
rel. Research Inst. v. Nix, 195 Okla. 176, 155 P.2d 983 (1044).
108. Bruce v. Gregory, 65 Cal. 2d 666, 678, 423 P.2d 193, 201, 56 Cal. Rptr.
265, 273 (1967).
109. Id.
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person inspecting the records is monopolizing them to the detriment
of other members of the public."10
The extent to which access may be limited requires a knowledge
of factors unique to each office and each group of records. For ex-
ample, substantial problems arose when 700 to 800 daily requests were
made for information contained in an eleven-volume record."' The
custodian established rules providing that any individual's inspection
was limited to one hour per day; the inspection was further limited to
those matters in which the individual had an interest; and a request
for a general personal inspection was denied. The limitations were up-
held because they were shown to be necessary in view of the limited
facilities and the number of requests for inspection by members of the
public.'- 2 In another case, the use of a card index system required
knowledge of a code. Although the public would normally have a
right to inspect the index personally, a rule permitting the use of the
index only under the supervision of the custodian's employees was up-
held in a unique situation where that was the most efficient method
of granting access."23
Although courts generally try to maximize the right of access,
problems can arise when exceptionally large requests for information
are made. Courts have therefore concluded that the right of access
is limited by the rule of reasonableness. An overly broad request for
large numbers of records does not have to be honored if compliance
would constitute an unreasonable burden upon the custodian of the re-
cords. For example, one court held that, in the absence of a central
index in a large school system, the board of education did not have
to search the records of over 800 schools to locate the addresses of two
students."14
3. Making Copies of Public Records
The right of inspection and examination also includes the right to
make copies of public records. The North Carolina access statute"'
110. Id.
111. In re Lord, 167 N.Y. 398, 40D, 60 N.E. 748, 749 (1901).
112. Id. at 401-02, 60 N.E. at 749.
113. State ex rel. Louisville Title Ins. Co. v. Brewer, 147 Ohio St. 161, 70 N.E.2d
265 (1946) (per curiam). The evidence showed that the rule was not imposed until
the custodian's work had been unreasonably hindered by the public's use of the index.
Id. at 163-64, 70 N.E.2d at 266.
114. Marquesano v. Board of Educ., 19 Misc. 2d 136, 191 N.Y.S.2d 713 (Sup. Ct.
1959).
115. N.C GEN. STAT. § 132-6 (1974).
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does not mention copying by the public, but the remedies section pro-
vides a remedy when a person has been denied access to public records
for the purpose of "inspection, examination or copying. 1" 6  Even in
the absence of specific language permitting copying, it has uniformly
been held that the right of inspection and examination includes, as a
necessary complement, the right to make copies.117
At one time, members of the public had to make all their copies
by hand or on a typewriter. Modem cases have held that photography
and photocopying are also proper methods."8  When public records
are stored in computers the right of inspection includes the right to
have copies of computer tapes." 9 Concern for the safety of public re-
cords, however, has led to certain limitations upon the right to make
copies. In making photocopies, members of the public have no ab-
solute right to use their own machines. The custodian has the option
of making the copies on his machine. 20
Considerations of safety should also lead to the conclusion that
members of the public have no right to make their own copies of mag-
netic tapes, whether they are computer tapes or voice recordings. The
custodian is generally obligated to provide copies of magnetic tapes
upon request, particularly when duplicate copies are kept available to
replace lost or damaged originals. 2' One court has held, however,
that if transcripts of a magnetic voice recording had already been made
available to the public, the possibility of damage to the original justified
a refusal to allow it to be duplicated.'22 Courts have also concluded
that the right to make copies is limited by the rule of reasonableness.
An agency's refusal to comply with a request for copies of documents
amounting to over 80,000 pages has been upheld, the court noting that
the public records statute was not intended to put state agencies into
the printing business. 2
116. Id. § 132-9 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
117. E.g., Fuller v. State ex rel. O'Donnell, 154 Fla. 368, 17 So. 2d 607 (1944);
Marsh v. Sanders, 110 La. 726, 34 So. 752 (1903).
118. E.g., People ex rel. Gibson v. Peller, 34 Ill. App. 2d 372, 181 N.E.2d 376
(1962); Logan v. Mississippi Abstract Co., 190 Miss. 479, 200 So. 716 (1941); Tobin
v. Knaggs, 107 S.W.2d 677 (Tex. Ct. App. 1937).
119. Menge v. City of Manchester, 113 N.H. 533, 311 A.2d 116 (1973).
120. Moore v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 39 N.J. 26, 186 A.2d 676 (1962);
Matte v. City of Winooski, 129 Vt. 61, 271 A.2d 830 (1970).
121. Ortiz v. Jaramillo, 82 N.M. 445, 483 P.2d 500 (1971).
122. Guarriello v. Benson, 90 N.J. Super. 233, 217 A.2d 22 (Super. Ct. Law Div.
1966).
123. Rosenthal v. Hansen, 34 Cal. App. 3d 754, 110 Cal. Rptr. 257 (1973).
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4. Fees for Inspection
Some cases in the late 1800's approved the practice of charging
fees for use of public records, particularly when persons were making
abstracts of records relating to land. Those decisions were reached be-
cause the custodian's pay consisted solely of the fees that he collected.
When the custodian's position became salaried, he was no longer al-
lowed to charge a fee for inspection of the records.124  Other courts
have refused to allow fees to be charged for inspection, even when the
custodian depended upon fees for his pay. 25
The modem rule is that no fee for inspection can be charged when
the custodian performs no services beyond locating and retrieving the
records.126  This principle applies even though the information ac-
quired from' the records may be sold for private gain. 127 Fees may
be permissible when extraordinary services are rendered. For ex-
ample, a rule requiring examiners to pay guards a fee for supervising
extensive examination of public records has been approved.128  Courts
have disagreed as to whether a fee may be imposed for continuous use of
office space in conducting examinations. 29
5. Fees for Copies of Public Records
While free access to public records must normally be allowed, fees
can often be charged for making copies of public records; however,
fees may be imposed only when the custodian makes the copies.
When members of the public make their own copies, whether by hand,
by typewriter or with their own copying machines, no fee for copies
may be imposed.13 0  When the custodian furnishes certified copies of
public records, the North Carolina statute provides for the payment of
legally prescribed fees;'' however, no statute of general applicability
sets fees for certified copies.'32 Using the fee schedule of registers
124. Compare Buck & Spencer v. Collins, 51 Ga. 391 (1874), with Atlanta Title
& Trust Co. v. Tidwell, 173 Ga. 499, 160 S.E. 620 (1931).
125. E.g., Bell v. Commonwealth Title Ins. & Trust Co., 189 U.S. 131 (1903).
126. State ex rel. Davis v. McMillan, 49 Fla. 243, 38 So. 666 (1905); State ex
rel Patterson v. Ayers, 171 Ohio St. 368, 171 N.E.2d 508 (1960).
127. Burton v. Tuite, 78 Mich. 363, 44 N.W. 282 (1889), enforced, 80 Mich. 218,
45 N.W. 88 (1890).
128. State ex rel. Higgins v. Lockwood, 74 N.J.L. 158, 64 A. 184 (1906).
129. A fee for extensive use of office space was permitted in Burton v. Reynolds,
102 Mich. 55, 60 N.W. 452 (1894) (per curiam). Contra, Atlanta Title & Trust Co.
v. Tidwell, 173 Ga. 499, 160 S.E. 620 (1931).
130. Whorton v. Gaspard, 239 Ark. 715, 393 S.W.2d 773 (1965).
131. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-6 (1974).
132. Fees to be charged by the Secretary of State are provided by id. § 147-37.
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of deeds as a guide, 3' one dollar is probably a legitimate amount to
charge for most certified copies.
A fee may also be charged when the custodian furnishes uncer-
tified copies of public records, whether the record is a simple docu-
ment 3 4 or a computer tape. 135  Again, using the North Carolina fee
schedule of registers of deeds as a guide, the fee should "bear a reason-
able relation to the quality of copies supplied and the cost of purchasing
and maintaining copying equipment."'1 6  This standard allows re-
covery of the actual costs of reproduction. The standard, however, re-
fers only to the equipment costs and the quality of copies, indicating
that there should be no recovery of the cost of labor incurred in making
the copies.'37
E. Remedies
An action to compel disclosure of public records may be brought
only after the custodian has either denied access or applied regulations
that unreasonably hinder or delay access.13  The complaint should be
directed to a specific, named officer; 3 9 and it should clearly describe
the materials that are alleged to be public records. 40 The complaint
should also allege that the request for access was made during regular
office hours.:'
The traditional form of relief for wrongful denial of access to pub-
lic records has been a writ of mandamus. 4 The North Carolina stat-
ute authorizes the court to issue "an order compelling disclosure."' 43
Although the North Carolina statute does not allocate the burden of
proof, the general rule is that once the person seeking inspection has
133. Id. § 161-10(9) (1976).
134. Sorley v. Lister, 33 Misc. 2d 471, 218 N.Y.S.2d 215 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
135. Menge v. City of Manchester, 113 N.H. 533, 311 A.2d 116 (1973).
136. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 161-10(11) (1976).
137. See Moore v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 39 N.J. 26, 186 A.2d 676 (1962).
138. Gorton v. Dow, 54 Misc. 2d 509, 282 N.Y.S.2d 841 (Sup. Ct. 1967)..
139. District of Columbia v. Bakersmith, 18 App. D.C. 574 (1901). Due process
requires that the custodian be given notice of an action to compel disclosure of records.
State ex rel. Ely v. Allen Circuit Court, 261 Ind. 419, 304 N.E.2d 777 (1973). A
person other than the usual custodian may be a proper defendant if that person has
the authority to permit inspection. Carter v. Fench, 322 So. 2d 305 (La. Ct. App.
1975).
140. District of Columbia v. Bakersmith, 18 App. D.C. 574 (1901).
141. State v. Egan, 159 La. 199, 105 So. 288 (1925).
142. E.g., Egan v. Board of Water Supply, 205 N.Y. 147, 98 N.E. 467 (1912).
143. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-9 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
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made the necessary prima facie allegations, 44 the burden of proof is
on the officer or agency to justify the denial of access.140  If a par-
ticular record is found to be open to public inspection, the prevailing
modem view is that the court must compel disclosure without regard
to the person's intended use of the records. 146  Generally, however,
courts retain a degree of equitable discretion and will deny access if
inspection is sought for unlawful purposes. 4
1H. A MORE EFFECTIVE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT
Despite the importance of the right to inspect public records, the
North Carolina statute adds little to the common law right of inspection.
While the statute defines public records broadly 48 and grants the right
of inspection to any person, 4 9 it leaves to the courts the task of defin-
ing exemptions and it fails to adequately encourage compliance. Any
public records statute places certain duties upon government employ-
ees; such a statute will be administered more effectively if those duties
144. See Yarish v. Nelson, 27 Cal. App. 3d 893, 903, 104 Cal. Rptr. 205, 213
(1972).
145. E.g., City of St. Matthews v. Voice of St. Matthews, Inc., 519 S.W.2d 811(Ky. 1974); MacEwan v. Holm, 226 Or. 27, 359 P.2d 413 (1961). See also Beckon
v. Emery, 36 Wis. 2d 510, 153 N.W.2d 501 (1967).
146. Direct Mail Serv., Inc. v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles,'296 Mass. 353, 5 N.E.2d
545 (1937); People ex rel. Brownell v. Higgins, 96 Misc. 485, 160 N.Y.S. 721 (Sup.
Ct. 1916).
Vestiges of the common law requirement of an interest in the record have led
some courts to state that access must be permitted only if inspection will serve a rather
nebulous "useful purpose." E.g., Pressman v. Elgin, 187 Md. 446, 451-52, 50 A.2d560, 563-64 (1947). Other courts have rejected such a requirement, holding that the
right of inspection "may be exercised out of idle curiosity." Butcher v. Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 163 Pa. Super. Ct. 343, 345, 61 A.2d 367, 368 (1948). See also MacEwan
v. Holm, 226 Or. 27, 359 P.2d 413 (1960).
147. Courts have stated that access may be denied if the records are to be used
for the following purposes: to further an illegal conspiracy restraining trade, Noerr
Motor Freight, Inc. v. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference, 155 F. Supp. 768 (E.D.
Pa. 1957); to make copies that are to be used to impair a common law copyright,
Edgar H. Wood Assocs., Inc. v. Skene, 347 Mass. 351, 363, 197 N.E.2d 886, 894 (1964);
or to intimidate or harass, State ex rel. Daily Gazette Co. v. Bailey, 152 W. Va. 521,
164 S.E.2d 414 (1968). If the custodian contends that the purpose of inspection is
harassment, there must be actual evidence of bad faith to justify the denial of access.
Welt v. Board of Educ., 68 Misc. 2d 1061, 328 N.Y.S.2d 930 (Sup. Ct. 1972); see
State ex rel. Hansen v. Schall, 126 Conn. 536, 12 A.2d 767 (1940); Casey v. MacPhail,
2 N.J. Super. 619, 65 A.2d 657 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1949); MacEwan v. Holm, 226
Or. 27, 359 P.2d 413 (1960). But see Moberly v. Herboldsheimer, 276 Md. 211, 227-
28, 345 A.2d 855, 864 (1975) ("invidious or improper motives" would not affect a
person's right to inspect public records). See also Industrial Foundation of the South
v. Texas Indus. Accid. Bd., 540 S.W.2d 668, 674-75 (Tex. 1976).
148. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-1 (Cum. Supp. 1975); see text accompanying notes
25-28 supra.
149. Id. §§ 132-6, -9 (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1975).
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are clearly and explicitly defined by the terms of the statute itself. In
addition, the right of inspection benefits the public generally, and a
clear, explicit statute would make it easier for members of the public
to become aware of and to exercise their rights under the statute. Fin-
ally, traditional remedies can be expanded or modified to discourage
delays caused by agency inaction. Suggestions for correcting some of
the weaknesses and deficiencies of the current North Carolina statute
are considered by way of the examination and evaluation of a proposed
model statute as well as the public records statutes of other jurisdic-
tions.'5 0
PROPOSED NORTH CAROLINA PUBLIC RECORDS ACT151
WITH COMMENTARY
Section 1: Declaration of Policy
The legislature, mindful of the right of individuals to privacy, finds
and declares that access to full and complete information regarding the
conduct of government and the official acts of public officials and em-
ployees is a fundamental and necessary right of every person. To that
end, the provisions of this Act shall be liberally construed.
Comment on Section 1
The general purposes of a public records statute are to encourage
informed participation in government, insure governmental account-
ability and increase public confidence in the political system. 152 The
policy of such an act should be to require disclosure of all public records
unless substantial reasons exist to require confidentiality. However,
conflicting interests are involved-the public's right to know must be
balanced against the need for individual privacy and the state's need
to maintain the confidentiality of certain matters. 5 3 This statute at-
150. For evaluations of the federal Freedom of Information Act, see Nader, Free-
dom From Information: The Act and the Agencies, 5 HIv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1
(1970); Note, The Freedom of Information Act: A Seven-Year Assessment, 74 COLUM.
L REV. 895 (1974).
151. This proposed act does not address questions relating to preservation and de-
struction of public records. It assumes that the current statutory provisions regulating
preservation and destruction will be retained. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 132-1 to -9
(1974 & Cum. Supp. 1975).
152. Project, Government Information and the Rights of Citizens, 73 MCH. L. REv.
971, 1164 (1975).
153. See Comment, Texas Open Records Act: Law Enforcement Agencies' In-
vestigatory Records, 29 Sw. L.J. 431, 434-38 (1975).
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tempts to provide a degree of flexibility to deal effectively with the
competing interests that may arise, and this declaration of policy should
serve as a guide to the interpretation and application of its provisions. 1 "4
Section 2: Short Title
This Act shall be known as the North Carolina Public Records
Act.
Section 3: Delinitiosm
For the purposes of construing this Act, unless the context re-
quires otherwise:
(1) "Agency" means any agency of North Carolina government
or its subdivisions, including every public office, public officer or offi-
cial (state or local, elected or appointed), institution, board, commis-
sion, bureau, council, department, authority or other unit of govern-
ment of the State or of any county, unit, special district or other political
subdivision of government.
(2) "Custodian" means the public official in charge of an office
having public records or any authorized person having personal custody
or control of public records.
(3) "Person in interest" means the person who is the subject
of a record or any representative designated by said person, except that
if the subject of the record is under legal disability, "person in interest"
shall mean his parent or duly appointed legal representative.
(4) "Public record" means any writing prepared, owned, used
or retained by any agency in pursuance of law or in connection with
the transaction of public business. "Writings" means all documents,
papers, letters, maps, books, photographs, films, sound recordings,
magnetic or other tapes, electronic data-processing records, artifacts or
other documentary material, regardless of physical form or character-
istics.
Comment on Section 3
In order to provide the maximum right of inspection, the defini-
tion of public records should be broad enough to include all records
154. Fbr statements of policy in other public records statutes, see, e.g., CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 6250 (West Cum. Supp. 1977); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-72-201 (1973); Tax.
11Ev. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 1 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1976-77). The Texas act
also requires its provisions to be liberally construed to provide the maximum rights
of inspection. Id. § 14(d).
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made or received in the transaction of public business.' 55 No good rea-
sons exist to limit arbitrarily the definition to records required by law
to be made or received. Many important records are maintained by
public agencies, not because of a legal requirement but rather because
of convenience and good office practices. Inspection of the records
of public agencies should be denied only when policy analysis has led
to a clear, specific exemption for a particular record or class of re-
cords.' 5 6
Section 4: Exemptions
(a) The following records are exempt from the disclosure re-
quirements of Section 7 of this Act:
(1) Records that are specifically exempted from disclosure
by a federal statute or regulation, or by a state statute;
(2) Investigatory records compiled for law enforcement
purposes, but only to the extent that the disclosure of such records
would (A) interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) deprive a per-
son of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) constitute
an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) disclose the identity
of a confidential source, (E) disclose investigative techniques and pro-
cedures or (F) endanger the life or physical safety of law enforcement
personnel;
(3) Test questions, scoring keys and other examination
data used to administer a licensing examination, examination for em-
ployment or academic examination;
(4) Communications within an agency or between agen-
cies of an advisory nature to the extent that they cover other than
purely factual materials and are preliminary to any final agency deter-
mination of policy or action. This exemption shall not apply unless the
public interest in encouraging frank communication between officials
155. For examples of broad definitions of public records, see 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(a)
(1)-(2) (1970 & Supp. V 1975); CAL. Gov'T CODE § 6252(d) (West Cum. Supp. 1977).
See also Project, supra note 152, at 1168-70.
156. An example of a narrow definition that obscures the real policy elements is
the rule that preliminary or tentative matters are not open for inspection until they
reach some final form. People ex rel. Better Broadcasting Council, Inc. v. Keane, 17
Ill. App. 3d 1090, 309 N.E.2d 362 (1973); Linder v. Eckard, 261 Iowa 216, 152 N.W.2d
833 (1967); Sanchez v. Board of Regents, 82 N.M. 672, 486 P.2d 608 (1971). It
would seem more accurate to acknowledge that preliminary matters are indeed public
records, and then proceed to a policy analysis to determine whether the particular record
should remain confidential until the transaction is completed. See Conover v. Board
of Educ., 1 Utah 2d 375, 267 P.2d 768 (1954).
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and employees of agencies clearly outweighs the public interest in dis-
closure;
(5) Information submitted to an agency in confidence,
when such information should reasonably be considered confidential and
the agency has obliged itself in good faith not to disclose the informa-
tion and the public interest would suffer by the disclosure;
(6) The contents of real estate appraisals, made by or for
any agency relative to the acquisition or sale of property, until the pro-
ject or prospective sale is abandoned, until all of the property has been
acquired or until the property to which the appraisal relates is sold. In
no event, however, shall disclosure be denied more than three years
after the appraisal;
(7) Library and museum material contributed by private
persons, to the extent of any limitations placed thereon as conditions
of such contributions.
(b) The following records are exempt from the disclosure re-
quirements of Section 7 of this chapter, except that any of the following
records shall be made available to the person in interest:
(1) Medical, psychological and similar files the disclosure
of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
(2) Trade secrets, privileged information and confidential
commercial information.
Comment on Section 4
One of the most serious weaknesses of the current North Carolina
statute is its almost total failure to specify any exemptions. 157 The
North Carolina courts can be expected to use their own judgment to-
gether with common law principles to create exemptions when none
exist in the current statute, but legislative guidance in making such
policy decisions would be helpful to all persons affected by the statute.
If the statute contained specific, narrowly-drawn exemptions, members
of the public could more easily understand their rights, the duties of
public officials would be more clearly defined and the courts would
have less difficulty in applying the policies of the act to a specific re-
cord. Exemptions should be carefully and narrowly drawn, however,
157. The only exemption mentioned in the statute is a limited exemption for com-
munications made by an attorney to a governmental client. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-
1.1 (Cum. Supp. 1975); see text accompanying notes 64-69 supra. A number of other
statutes, however, contain provisions that determine the status of various types of rec-
ords; see statutes cited in note 44 supra.
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to prevent them from becoming giant loopholes that can be manip-
ulated by the agencies.'
The exemptions listed in the above model statute are not intended
to be exhaustive. They are merely intended to illustrate to the reader
exemptions that the legislature might create. Although various statutes
from other jurisdictions contain different exemptions, a number of com-
mon policies can be found underlying most of those exemptions.1
59
Specific exemptions from disclosure requirements have been created:
(1) disclosure prohibited by state or federal statute; 60 (2) to protect
agency deliberative processes;' 6' (3) to protect confidential sources of
information;' 62 (4) to protect the confidentiality of certain law enforce-
ment records; 16 3 (5) to protect public and state interests, financial'"
and otherwise; 65 (6) to protect generally against invasions of personal
privacy; 66 (7) to maintain the confidentiality of privileged records; 67
and (8) to protect confidential commercial data and trade secrets.' 68
158. See Nader, supra note 150.
159. Project, supra note 152, at 1172-74; Comment, The California Public Records
Act: The Public's Right of Access to Governmental Information, 7 PAC. L.J. 105, 109-
10 (1976). See also Republican Party v. State ex rel. Hall, 240 Ark. 545, 548, 400
S.W.2d 660, 662 (1966); Gold v. McDermott, 32 Conn. Supp. 583, 347 A.2d 643, 647
(Super. Ct. 1975).
160. E.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1970).
161. E.g., id. § 552(b)(5); OR. REv. STAT. § 192.500(2)(a) (1975); Tax. REv.
Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 3(11) (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1976-77); WASH. REv.
CODE ANN. § 42.17.310(i) (Supp. 1975).
162. E.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 192.500(2)(c) (1975); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
42.17.310(1) (e) (Supp. 1975).
163. E.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (Supp. V 1975); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-72-204(2)
(a)(I) (1973); OR. REv. STAT. § 192.500(1)(c), (2)(d) (1975); TEX. REv. CIv. STAT.
ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 3(8) (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1976-77); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §
42.17.310(1)(d) (Supp. 1975).
164. E.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(8) (1970); CAL. GoV'VT CODE § 6254(h) (West Cum.
Supp. 1977); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-72-204(2) (a) (IV) (1973); OR. REv. STAT. §§
192.500(1)(e), (f) (1975); Tax. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 3(a)(4), (5),
(12) (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1976-77); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 42.17.310(1)(g) (Supp.
1975).
165. E.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2) (1970); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6254(g) (West Cum.
Supp. 1977); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-72-204(2)(a)(II), (I1) (1973); OR. REv. STAT.
§ 192.500(1)(d) (1975); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 42.17.310(1)(f) (Supp. 1975).
166. E.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6), (7) (1970 & Supp. V 1975); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 24-72-204(3)(a)(H) (1973); OR. REv. STAT. § 192.500(2)(b) (1975); TEx. REv.
Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 3(a)(2), (9), (14) (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1976-77);
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 42.17.310(1)(a)-(d) (Supp. 1975).
167. E.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6254(k) (West Cum. Supp. 1977); OR. REv. STAT.
§ 192.500(2)(h) (1975); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 3(a)(3) (Vernon
Cum. Supp. 1976-77); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 42.17.310(1) (j) (Supp. 1975).
168. E.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1970); CAL. GoV'T CODE § 6254.7(d) (West
Cum. Supp. 1977); OR. Ry. STAT. § 192.500(1)(b), (e) (1975); Tx. REv. Crv.
STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 3(a) (10) (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1976-77).
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Section 5: Effects of Exemptions
(a) The custodian may permit inspection or copying of any
specific records exempt under the provisions of Section 4 of this Act
if the exemption of such records is clearly unnecessary to protect any
individual's right of privacy or any vital governmental function.
(b) The custodian may deny examination of a public record not
exempt by Section 4 of this Act if, on the facts of the particular case,
such examination would clearly not be in the public interest and would
substantially and irreparably damage any person or would substantially
and irreparably damage vital governmental functions.
(c) An agency may voluntarily make part or all of its records
available to the public if: (1) examination is not expressly prohibited
by law; (2) the records are then made available to any person; and
(3) the agency takes proper precautions to protect against unwarranted
invasions of personal privacy.
Comment on Section 5
In establishing exemptions, it is important to consider whether
they should be construed as absolute or conditional. The common law
gives courts some flexibility in finding exemptions by virtue of the ju-
dicially created public interest standard used in determining which re-
cords are exempt from public inspection. 0 9 On the other hand, the
exemptions provided in the federal Freedom of Information Act are
exhaustive, and the courts have no equitable discretion under that act
to allow records to be withheld unless they fall within one of the stat-
utory exemptions. 170
This model statute is patterned after state acts that have taken in-
termediate positions. Those state acts contain specific exemptions, but
they also permit the courts to find additional exemptions by using varia-
tions of the public interest standard. 171 Conversely, some state acts do.
169. See text accompanying notes 47-49 supra.
170. Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
171. E.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6255 (West Cure. Supp. 1977); WASH. RnV. CoDn
ANN. § 42.17.330 (Supp. 1975). The Colorado act contains a unique provision directing
the custodian to apply for a court order authorizing disclosure restrictions if the cus-
todian believes that public inspection of the record would do "substantial injury" to the
public interest. CoLO. REv. STAT. § 24-72-204(6) (1973). As a practical matter, it
appears difficult to enforce the requirement that the custodian seek a court order. Per-
haps the custodian's failure to apply for such an order would influence a judge's decision
to award court costs and attorney's fees to the party seeking disclosure as provided by
id. § 24-72-204(5).
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not consider the specific exemptions conclusive-although a record fits
a statutory exemption, inspection by the public must nevertheless be
permitted.1 2  Such provisions indicate that the exemptions are not only
intended to provide clear guidance to public officers and the courts in
responding to requests for inspection, but also to retain a degree of
flexibility in order to avoid unreasonable results in exceptional cases.
An effective public records statute should also indicate whether
its exemptions are mandatory. The traditional rule is that statutory or
common law exemptions are not mandatory, and the custodian has the
discretion to open a record to public inspection unless expressly pro-
hibited by statute.173  It is often important, however, that information
remain confidential, particularly when privacy interests are involved.
Therefore, this model statute specifies that nondisclosure is mandatory
when required by privacy considerations. 17
4
Once a decision has been made to withhold a particular record
from public inspection, the general rule is that it may not be disclosed
to a member of the public without disclosing it to any and all persons
requesting an inspection. 7 5  When the government maintains informa-
tion on individuals, however, it is often desirable to permit the subject
to inspect the records pertaining to him while withholding those records
from the public generally. Therefore, it is advisable to identify those
records that only the subject should be able to inspect and to include
172. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6254(a) (West Cum. Supp. 1977); OR. REV. STAT. §
192.500(1) (1975); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 42.17.310(3) (Supp. 1975).
173. Texas has incorporated this rule into its statute. TEx. Rav. Civ. STAT. ANN.
art. 6252-17a, § 14(a) (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1976-77).
174. Some North Carolina statutes contain provisions requiring that the confiden-
tiality of various tax records be maintained. E.g., N.C. Gm. STAT. §§ 105-259, -289(e),
-296(h) (Cum. Supp. 1975).
Although the problems associated with "reverse freedom of information" suits are
beyond the scope of this comment, those suits are becoming increasingly important in
the federal courts and should not be ignored in providing protection for legitimate pri-
vacy interests. See Project, supra note 152, at 1221-1340; Comment, Reverse-Freedom
of Information Act Suits: Confidential Information in Search of Protection, 70 Nw.
U.L Rv. 995 (1976); Comment, Public Access to Government-Held Computerized In-
formation, 68 Nw. U.L REv. 433 (1973); Note, Protection From Government Disclo-
sure-The Reverse-FOIA Suit, 1976 DuKE L.J. 330; Note, The Privacy Act of 1974:
An Overview, 1976 Du L.J. 301.
For some possible solutions to privacy problems posed by criminal justice informa-
tion systems, see 28 C.F.R. § 20 (1976); Swan, Privacy and Record Keeping: Remedies
for the Misuse of Accurate Information, 54 N.C.L. REV. 585, 594-602 (1976).
175. See text accompanying note 76 supra. See also CoLo. REa. STAT. § 24-72-204
(2) (b) (1973); Tax. Rlv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 14(a) (Vernon Cum. Supp.
1976-77).
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in the statute a special section for subject access, as provided in section
4(b) of this model act.'
Section 6: Deleting Confidential Information
(a) Agencies shall, whenever reasonably possible, avoid combin-
ing public records that must be open for inspection with public records
that are exempt from public inspection.
(b) The exemptions of Section 4 of this Act are inapplicable to
the extent that information, the disclosure of which would violate per-
sonal privacy or vital governmental interests, can be deleted from the
specific records sought. In each case the custodian shall fully explain
in writing to the person seeking inspection the justification for the dele-
tion.
(c) No exemption shall permit the nondisclosure of statistical in-
formation not descriptive of any readily identifiable person or persons.
Comment on Section 6
The right of inspection can be unreasonably curtailed when public
officials unnecessarily combine exempt and non-exempt materials.177
Public officials should therefore be encouraged to follow record-keep-
ing procedures that enhance, rather than limit, the public's right of in-
spection. 178
It is sometimes necessary to combine exempt and non-exempt ma-
terials; consequently, a statute should require the agency to edit the
records in response to requests for inspection, deleting confidential in-
formation whenever possible. 179  Although editing can enhance the
176. See Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (Supp. V 1975); CoLo. REv. STAT.
§ 24-72-204(3) (1973). North Carolina also has some statutes that provide special
rights of inspection for the subjects of the records. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-287
(1969) (juvenile records); id. § 34-15 (veterans' records). See also H. TuRNBULL &
C. M CLLASTER, TuE LAW AND THE MENTALLY HANDICAPPED IN NORTH CAROLINA, 3-
1 to 3-16 (1976).
177. Nader, supra note 150, at 9-10.
178. Holcombe v. State ex rel. Chandler, 240 Ala. 590, 200 So. 739 (1941). In
Holcombe, the Alabama Supreme Court required a sheriff to permit public inspection
of certain prison records, even though the sheriff contended that the records contained
some confidential information concerning persons indicted but not yet arrested. Implicit
in the court's opinion was a finding that records of pre-arrest indictments should not
be maintained by the sheriff on forms designed for prisoners and in books containing
records that must be open to public inspection. Id. at 599, 200 So. at 748.
179. E.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (Supp. V 1975); On. REV. STAT. § 192.500(3) (1975);
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 42.17.310(2) (Supp. 1975).
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goals of a public records statute, it is a burdensome task that requires
some knowledge of the law. It is also possible that, in deleting con-
fidential portions of documents, either the deleted portions can be in-
ferred from the balance or the deletions may reach the point that it
would be meaningless to disclose the balance. Editing, therefore,
should only be required: (1) upon documents that contain, for the
most part, non-exempt material; (2) when segregation of exempt and
non-exempt information is reasonably possible; and (3) when editing
can be accomplished without destroying the confidentiality of exempt
material. 80 It is also possible to delete certain identifying details' 8'
and to release statistical information'8 " without disclosing the identities
of the persons involved, thereby protecting their rights of privacy while
permitting public access to valuable documents and statistical data.
Section 7: Inspection and Copying of Public Records
Every person has a right to inspect or copy any public record in
this state, except as expressly provided by Sections 4 and 5 of this Act.
Comment on Section 7
The common law requirement that a person show some interest
in a record before being allowed to inspect is generally disfavored. 8 3
Some states still retain a minimal standing requirement,'84 but the trend
is to grant the right of inspection to any person without regard to inter-
est in the record or other special considerations of standing. Since the
right of inspection is intended to benefit the public generally, the better
approach is to allow any member of the public to enforce that right.
The only standing requirement remaining is that a person must actually
be denied access to records before instituting judicial proceedings. 8 5
180. Turner v. Reed, 538 P.2d 373, 377 n.8 (Or. Ct. App. 1975); Comment, supra
note 159, at 147-48.
181. E.g., WAsH. RFv. CODE ANN. §§ 42.17.260(1), .310(2) (Supp. 1975).
182. Id. § 42.17.310(2).
183. See text accompanying notes 78-83 supra.
184. For example, Louisiana grants the right of access to taxpayers, electors or their
agents. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 44:31 (West 1950). However, a Louisiana court has
indicated that even a casual visitor to the state who has bought merchandise and paid
the sales tax might be able to enforce the right of inspection. State ex rel. Roussel v.
St. John the Baptist Parish School Bd., 135 So. 2d 665 (La. Ct. App. 1961).
185. But see notes 70 & 176 supra (situations in which personal need might influence
a decision to permit inspection and in which access might be allowed only if the subject
of the record is seeking an inspection).
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Section 8: Access to Public Records
(a) Availability of Public Records. Unless otherwise expressly
provided by statute, the custodian of public records shall furnish proper
and reasonable opportunities for inspection and examination of the re-
cords in his office and reasonable facilities for making memoranda or
abstracts therefrom, during usual business hours, to all persons making
a request for public records that reasonably describes such records.
Upon request, the custodian shall also provide exact copies of public
records or shall permit any person to use agency facilities for the copy-
ing of public records, unless it is clearly impracticable to do so. Com-
puter data shall be provided in a form determined by the agency.
(b) Request by Mail or Telephone. Requests for copies of public
records that reasonably describe the records sought and that are re-
ceived by mail or by telephone shall be honored by agencies unless
such records are exempt from inspection by the provisions of this Act.
(c) Rules and Regulations. Reasonable rules and regulations
shall be adopted and enforced, consistent with the intent of this Act
to provide full public access to public records, but only to the extent
necessary (1) to protect public records from damage or disorganization
and (2) to prevent excessive interference with other essential functions
of the agency. Such rules and regulations shall provide for the fullest
assistance to inquiries and the most timely action possible on requests
for information.
For local government agencies, the rules and regulations shall be
promulgated by the appropriate governing body or by the agency pur-
suant to policies and guidelines established by the governing body.
State agencies shall adopt their own rules and regulations.
Such rules and regulations shall be prominently posted by the
agency and shall be made available upon request free of charge to any
person seeking to inspect or copy that agency's public records.
(d) Records That Are Unavailable. If the public records re-
quested are in active use or in storage and are therefore not available
at the time an applicant wishes to examine them, the custodian shall
promptly notify the applicant of this fact, in writing if requested by the
applicant. The custodian shall set a date and hour within three work-
ing days at which time the records will be available for inspection.
If the public records requested are not in the custody or control
of the person to whom application is made, such person shall promptly
notify the applicant of this fact, in writing if requested by the applicant.
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In such notification, he shall state in detail to the best of his kmowledge
and belief the reason for the absence of the records from his custody
or control, their location and the name of the person who has custody
or control of the records.
(e) Denial of Access. If the custodian denies access to any public
record, the applicant may request a written statement of the grounds
for the denial. The statement shall cite the specific exemption that
applies to the record in question.
(f) Prompt Responses Required. Agency responses to requests
for inspection shall be made promptly. Agencies shall establish mech-
anisms for the prompt review of decisions denying inspection, and such
review of denials shall be deemed completed at the end of the fifth
business day following the receipt of the request for inspection and
shall constitute final agency action for the purposes of review by the
Attorney General.
(g) Removal of Public Records. Nothing in this Act shall au-
thorize any person to remove original copies of public records from the
offices of any agency without the written permission of the custodian
of the records.
(h) No Duty To Perform General Research. This Act does not
require the custodian to perform general research within the reference
and research archives and holdings of state libraries.
Comment on Section 8
It would be difficult, if not impossible, to define with any degree
of specificity the types of limits that may be placed upon the right of
access. The characteristics of offices differ greatly, and the demands
for inspection may range from many daily requests to virtually no re-
quests. Therefore, the best approach is to provide general guidelines,
leaving to the agencies, and ultimately the courts, the task of applying
those guidelines to the needs of a particular office or agency. The
guidelines should indicate that free inspection and copying of public
records during all office hours8 6 is the rule; limits should be placed
upon that right only when strictly necessary to protect the records and
to prevent undue interference with the operations of the agency. 7
Every public office or agency, however, should be required to promul-
186. E.g., WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 42.17.280 (Supp. 1975).
187. E.g., O& REv. STAT. § 192.430 (1975); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 42.17.270,
.290 (Supp. 1975). See also text accompanying note 94 supra.
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gate its rules for inspection in advance and to make those rules avail-
able to persons seeking to inspect or copy public records. 18 8 Such a
requirement limits the chances for arbitrary and unreasonable limita-
tions on the right of access that can often result when rules are made
on an ad hoc basis.
Section 9: Fees for Inspection and Copying
(a) Inspection. No fee may be charged for the inspection and
copying of public records except as provided by this section.
(b) Certified Copies. The custodian of public records shall fur-
nish upon request certified copies of such records if the record is of a
nature permitting such copying. The agency may establish fees rea-
sonably calculated to reimburse it for its actual cost in making such
copies available, but in no event shall the fee exceed one dollar per
page, except as otherwise expressly provided by statute.
(c) Other Copies. Agencies may impose a reasonable charge for
providing copies of public records and for the use by any person of
agency equipment to make copies of public records. The charge may
not exceed the actual cost of reproduction exclusive of costs of labor,
except as otherwise expressly provided by statute. However, in cases
of exceptionally large and burdensome requests for copies that can only
be made by the custodian, the charge may include costs of reproduction
and reasonable labor costs.
(d) Deposit. The agency may require the person requesting
copies to furnish a deposit, consisting of the anticipated costs of copy-
ing such records, as a condition precedent to the making of such copies.
(e) Waiver of Fees. Copies of public records shall be furnished
without charge or at a reduced charge when the agency determines that
waiver or reduction of the fee is in the public interest because furnish-
ing the information can be considered as primarily benefitting the gen-
eral public.
(f) Stocks of Publications. The fee provisions of this section do
not apply to stocks of publications properly held for sale.
Comment on Section 9
While no costs should be imposed for mere inspection, it is reason-
188. E.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) (1970); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 42.17.250(1)
(Supp. 1975). See also City of Philadelphia v. Ruczynski, 24 Pa. D. & C.2d 478 (C.P.
1961).
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able to impose a fee when the agency or officer provides copies of pub-
lic records. A public records statute should make provisions for such
a fee, by way of either a specific amount 189 or a formula for establish-
ig a reasonable fee. 190 Costs should generally be minimized to avoid
placing unnecessary burdens upon the right of access. The agency has
a duty to provide its records for public inspection. This model statute
provides that charges should cover only costs of reproduction, leaving
the agency, except in the case of voluminous reproduction, the burden
of absorbing labor costs."9
Section 10: Limits Upon the Use of Public Records
This Act does not authorize any agency to give, sell or provide
access to lists of individuals requested for commercial purposes, and
agencies shall not do so unless specifically authorized or directed by
law. Lists of applicants for professional licenses and lists of profes-
sional licensees, however, shall be made available, upon request, to
those professional associations or educational organizations recognized
by their professional licensing or examination board.
Comment on Section 10
One of the most substantial interests that the Act attempts to pro-
tect is the right of personal privacy. This section is intended to protect
individuals from particularly objectionable uses of public records.192
Section 11: Pre-Judicial Review of Denial of Inspection
(a) Petitioning the Attorney General. Any person denied the
right to inspect or to receive a copy of any public record of any agency,
or subjected to rules and regulations that unreasonably limit access to
public records in violation of this Act, may petition the Attorney Gen-
eral, either to review the public record to determine if it may be with-
held from public inspection or to review the agency's rules and regula-
tions to determine if they are unreasonable and in violation of this Act.
189. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 24-72-205 (1973).
190. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (4) (A) (Supp. V 1975); WASH. Rav. CODE ANN. §
42.17.300 (Supp. 1975). The North Carolina fee schedule for registers of deeds con-
tains a formula for determining the fee to be charged for making uncertified copies.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 161-10(11) (1976).
191. See Moore v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 39 N.J. 26, 186 A.2d 676 (1962).
192. See Accident Index Bureau, Inc. v. Male, 95 N.J. Super. 39, 229 A.2d 812
(Super. Ct. App. Div. 1967). See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 34-15 (1976); id. § 108-
45 (1975).
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The burden is on the agency to sustain its action. The Attorney Gen-
eral shall issue an advisory opinion denying or granting the petition,
or denying it in part and granting it in part, within seven days from
the day he receives the petition.
(b) Form of Petition. A petition to the Attorney General re-
questing him to order that a public record be made available for in-
spection or be produced shall be substantially in the following form,
or in a form containing the same information:
(date)
I (we), (name(s)), the undersigned, request the
Attorney General to determine if (name of agency) and
its employees are required to make available for inspection (or produce
a copy or copies of) the following records:
1. (name or description of record)
2. (name or description of record)
I (we) requested to inspect and/or copy these records on
(date) at (address). The request was denied by the
following person(s):
1.
(name of public officer or employee and title or position, if
known)
2.
(name of public officer or employee and title or position, if
known) (signature(s))
This form shall be delivered or mailed to the Attorney Generals office.
Upon receipt of such a petition, the Attorney General shall notify
promptly the agency involved. The agency shall then transmit the
public record disclosure of which is sought, or a copy, to the Attorney
General, together with a statement of its reasons for believing that the
public record should not be disclosed. In an appropriate case, with
the consent of the Attorney General, the agency may disclose instead
the nature or substance of the public record to the Attorney General.
Comment on Section 11
The current North Carolina statute provides a remedy for wrong-
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ful denial of access to public records, 193 but the possibilities of delay
in obtaining relief and the costs of litigation render that remedy largely
ineffective. As a practical matter, public officials can expect very few
court challenges to wrongful denials of access under the current statute.
A number of factors can delay or restrict judicial resolution of the mat-
ter: the agency might take a long time to reach its decision whether
to deny access; there may be no administrative review of the denial;
court action may be delayed; costs of litigation may be prohibitive; and
judicial sanctions may be ineffective in encouraging agency compliance.
In the face of such obstacles, it is no wonder that there has been no
appellate litigation on the subject in North Carolina. It is clearly neces-
sary to provide speedy, effective relief for wrongful denials of access.
Access to public records can be effectively denied by agencies,
not by clear refusals, but through delays and inaction. Probably the
best solution to such delays is to presume a denial if the agency fails
to reach a decision within a specified time period, as provided in section
9(f) of this model act.'94 Following denial of access, the prospect of
litigation may not appear practical to most individuals. Thus, the
Texas and Oregon acts invoke the aid of the attorney general in enforc-
ing the right of access. The Texas act provides that if the govern-
mental body wants to withhold a particular record, it must, within ten
days after receiving a request for information, request a decision on
the matter by the attorney general.'95 The Oregon act takes a slightly
different approach, authorizing individuals to request a decision by the
attorney general.' 96 Under both of these acts, the attorney general's
role is made an indispensable part of the review process. 1 7
This section of the model act permits a citizen to invoke the aid
of the attorney general. In keeping with the traditional role of the at-
torney general in North Carolina, 98 his opinion is advisory only, and
193. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-9 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
194. The Oregon statute provides that failure to act upon a request within seven
days constitutes denial. OR. REv. STAT. § 192.465 (1975). The Washington statute re-
quires the agency to give specific reasons for denial of access, and agency review of the
denial is considered final at the end of the second business day following the denial.
It has, however, no time limits applicable to the initial denial of access. WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 42.17.310 (4), .320 (Supp. 1975).
195. TEx. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 7 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1976-77).
This requirement is not applicable to records that have previously been declared exempt
from inspection by either the attorney general or the courts. Id.
196. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 192.450, .465, .470 (1975).
197. Id.; TEx. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a, § 7 (Vernon Cur. Supp.
1976-77).
198. Lawrence v. Shaw, 210 N.C. 352, 361, 186 S.E. 504, 509-10 (1936); see N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 114-2(5) (1975).
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neither the agency nor the person seeking inspection is required to ob-
tain his opinion prior to instituting court action. Although such an
opinion is only advisory, it would be expected that in most situations
an agency would routinely abide by the opinion. Thus, the provision
permits a member of the public to obtain prompt and, in most cases,
effective review by a neutral party without that person having to obtain
a lawyer's services.
Section 12: Judicial Authority
(a) Judicial Review. Any person aggrieved under this Act
may institute proceedings for injunctive or declarative relief in the Su-
perior Court to enforce his rights under this Act. The court shall de-
termine the matter de novo, and the burden is on the agency to sustain
its action. The court may view the documents in camera before reach-
ing a decision. In the event of noncompliance with the order of the
court, the responsible agency employee may be punished for contempt
of court.
(b) Expedited Hearing. Except as to causes the court considers
of greater importance, proceedings arising under this Act shall take
precedence on the docket over all other causes and shall be assigned
for trial at the earliest practicable date and expedited in every way.
The times for responsive pleadings and for hearings in such proceed-
ings shall be set by the court with the object of securing a decision at
the earliest possible time.
(c) Attorney's Fees. If the withholding of records was without
substantial justification, or if the agency rules and regulations regarding
access to public records were promulgated or applied without sub-
stantial justification, the aggrieved party shall be awarded his costs and
disbursements and reasonable attorney's fees. If the aggrieved party
prevails in part, the court may in its discretion award him his costs and
disbursements and reasonable attorney's fees or an appropriate portion
thereof.
Comment on Section 12
An important element of effective relief is prompt resolution of
disputes. A statutory provision requiring that suits for disclosure be
given preference on court dockets and be heard at the earliest possible
time can prevent many delays that normally accompany litigation.109
199. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (4) (D) (Supp. V 1975); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
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Such a provision is particularly important in the case of public records
because a delay in resolution often amounts to a denial of relief as a
practical matter.
The issues should also be determined by the court de novo.200 An
agency decision regarding public access to records should not be given
deference by the courts-the issue does not involve an area of agency
expertise and the policies of a public records act require the courts to
guard against the natural tendency of public agencies to unnecessarily
withhold records from public inspection, particularly when disclosure
might cause inconvenience or embarassment to the officials involved.
Once the person seeking to compel disclosure has established a
prima facie case, the burden of proof should be upon the agency to
justify its denial of inspection.201  Such an allocation of the burden of
proof coincides with the policy of permitting inspection unless good rea-
son can be shown to withhold the record. Also, since only the agency
knows the actual contents of the record, it is the only party able to sus-
tain the burden of proof. It is often possible for the court to reach
a decision merely upon the agency's affidavits, depositions and wit-
nesses, without actually examining the records in issue. 2  If the
agency cannot meet its burden of proof without disclosing the informa-
tion claimed to be confidential, however, the court should be authorized
to reach a decision by examining the records in camera.203
The court's decision and order may take various forms,20 4 but the
effects of the order are generally the same. If a public official fails
to permit inspection as directed by the court order, he may be cited
§ 24-72-204(5) (1973); OR. Rnv. STAT. § 192.490(2) (1975).
200. E.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (4) (B) (Supp. V 1975); OR. REV. STAT. § 192.490(1)
(1975); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 42.17.340(2) (Supp. 1975).
201. E.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (Supp. V 1975); OR. REv. STAT. § 192.490(1)
(1975); WASH. RIv. CODE ANN. § 42.17.340(1) (Supp. 1975).
202. It is obviously unnecessary to introduce the disputed records into evidence for
all parties to examine. In a South Carolina case, the court held that after an agency
introduced contested records into evidence, claims of confidentiality need not be consid-
ered. Florence Morning News, Inc. v. Building Comm'n, 265 S.C. 389, 218 S.E.2d 881
(1975).
203. E.g., OR. REv. STAT. § 192-490 (1975); WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. § 42.17.340
(2) (Supp. 1975). The decision to conduct an in camera inspection is, under most stat-
utes, a discretionary decision, but failure to conduct such an inspection when the
agency has no other method of meeting its burden of proof constitutes abuse of discre-
tion. In re Muszalski, 52 Cal. App. 3d 475, 125 Cal. Rptr. 281 (1975).
204. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 6258 (West Cum. Supp. 1977) (injunctive or declaratory
relief); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-9 (Cum. Supp. 1975) ("order compelling disclosure");
TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art 6252-17a § 8 (Vernon Cun. Supp. 1976) (mandamus).
1977] 1225
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
for contempt. °5 Some state acts authorize civil or criminal penalties
for wrongful refusal to permit inspection of public records. The maxi-
mum criminal penalties range from a fine of twenty dollars for each
month of refusal 20 6 to a one thousand dollar fine or six months impris-
onment.2 07 Maximum civil penalties range from twenty-five dollars for
each day access is wrongfully denied 208 to one hundred dollars per of-
fense.209  Most withholding of information, however, is probably not
in bad faith, so it seems that punitive sanctions would be seldom used
and largely ineffective in enforcing such an administrative duty. 10
Although punitive sanctions may be ineffective in enforcing the
right of inspection, a number of statutes reflect an awareness that litiga-
tion costs often discourage enforcement of the right by persons who
have been denied access to public records. Particularly in cases in
which inspection is sought, not for private gain, but for the purely public
purpose of monitoring the performance of officials and agencies as con-
templated by the statutes, the public interest compels the conclusion
that enforcement by "private attorneys general" should be encouraged.
In such a situation, however, it is seldom possible for an individual to
invest large amounts of money into litigation, even when that person
clearly has a right to inspect the record. Therefore, a number of stat-
utes permit private litigants to recover attorney's fees and other litiga-
tion costs.' The California and Washington statutes provide that win-
ning plaintiffs "shall" be awarded costs and fees;21 such a recovery is
205. E.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE § 6259 (West Supp. 1977); OR. REv. STAT. § 192.490
(1) (1975). The order compelling disclosure should be directed to the responsible
agency employee rather than the agency itself because the order can then be enforced
by finding the responsible employee to be in contempt of court if he fails to permit in-
spection. Note, The Information Act: Judicial Enforcement of the Records Provision,
54 VA. L. Rnv. 466, 482-84 (1968).
206. MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 66, § 15 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1971).
207. A. R.av. STAT. ANN. § 44:37 (West 1950). The minimum penalty for the first
offense is a one hundred dollar fine or one month imprisonment. For subsequent con-
victions, the possible penalties are increased to fines ranging from $250 to $2000 or im-
prisonment for periods ranging from two to six months or both. Id.
208. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 42.17.340(3) (Supp. 1975).
209. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 149.99 (Page 1969).
210. The original North Carolina statute provided a misdemeanor penalty of a max-
imum of twenty dollars for each month of refusal or neglect in permitting public rec-
ords to be inspected, but the legislature apparently concluded that such a punitive sanc-
tion was ineffective and amended that provision to eliminate the criminal penalty. Act
of May 2, 1935, ch. 265, § 9, 1935 N.C. Sess. Laws 290 (current version at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 132-9 (Cum. Supp. 1975)). See also COLO. Rlv. STAT. § 24-72-206
(1973) (provides misdemeanor penalties only if the violation is wilful and knowing).
211. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6259 (West Cum. Supp. 1977); WAsH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 42.17.340(3) (Supp. 1975). The California provision specifies that the costs and fees
are the liability of the agency rather than the individual official. That statute also per-
mits the agency to recover its court costs and attorney's fees if the plaintiffs case is
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permitted under the federal act if the complaining party "has sub-
stantially prevailed";2 12 and the Colorado act permits recovery if the
denial is arbitrary or capricious.213
Section 13: Penalty
Any person who wilfully destroys, mutilates, removes without
permission as provided by this Act, or alters public records is guilty of
a misdemeanor.
lV. CONCLUSION
The current North Carolina public records statute214 gives all
members of the public the right to inspect a broad class of records;
however, the statute provides only the basic framework through which
the boundaries of that right of inspection can be developed by the
courts. Since the North Carolina appellate courts have decided no
cases under the current statute, officials and members of the public
must look to cases from other jurisdictions to be able to understand the
actual elements of the right of inspection.
It seems clear that members of the public are sometimes denied
access to records that they have a right to inspect, whether the reason
for the refusal is a misunderstanding of the law, mere indifference or
an actual desire of the custodian to avoid public disclosure of certain
information. The absence of litigation under the current statute would
seem to indicate that the law is difficult to apply and enforce.
In order for North Carolina citizens to have an effective right of
inspection, members of the public and public officials need an unam-
biguous statute defining those records that must be open for inspection.
In addition, an effective, speedy remedy must be provided that will not
drain the financial resources of the private litigant. Enhancing the
right of access to public records benefits not only the individual seeking
inspection, but benefits also other members of the public by ensuring
the accountability of public officials. The legislature would be well ad-
vised to consider the importance of the issues involved and to enact
the necessary measures to improve the right of access in North Caro-
lina.
JOSEPH D. JOHNSON
"clearly frivolous." CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6259 (West Cum. Supp. 1977).
212. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (4) (E) (Supp. V 1975).
213. CoLO. REv. STAT. § 24-72-204(5) (1973).
214. N.C. Gw. STAT. §§ 132-1 to -9 (1974 &Cum. Supp. 1975).
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